Warbird Information Exchange

Fighter Tactics
[By Claude R. Burton]

Fighter tactics are something that can’t
be put into words. The basic ideas on this
subject can [be] talked about, discussed, and illus-
trated by movies and drawings. However[,]
after discussing, seeing pictures and movies
you still need practice and you can never suc-
cessfully do fighter tactics without practice
and plenty of it.

During the first world war was when the
dogfight was first used and then was every
man for himself. This worked very good
then and no effort was made to improve
on it during the time between World War I
and World War II. The Germans started using
squadrons of fighters to attack targets in the
countrys [sic] they took over and headlines in-
formed us that the opposition using the
World War I type of fighting just didn’t work.
The United States didn’t think we’d ever be
involved in another war so we were pitifully
unprepared on that fateful day of 9 [sic] December
1941.[1] We had to build our Air Force in both
personnel and aircraft. Most of our experience
and the present fighter tactics were developed
and proved during these war years. It started
as a hit and miss system and if a man tried
something and it kept working it was generally
used until something better was found.
It was found though that tactics depended on
the locale, experience of the enemy pilot, the
type [of] aircraft, type of armament, performance
of the aircraft and many other things. In the
Pacific the Japanese planes generally were very light
and consequently very maneuverable. They sacri-
ficed many safety features for maneuverability.
They had no self[-]sealing fuel tanks, compari-
tively little armor plating, and generally
a very light construction. The Germans had
very well built aircraft and they compared
quite favorably with ours as far as in maneuverability[,]
armor plating, self[-]sealing fuel tanks. We
found that the German pilots compared very

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closely to the American [pilots] until the last part of
the war. We picked up many of their tactics
and improved on some. We, through our war ef-
forts, starting making tremendous advances in
better and faster aircraft. We went from a
light hitting armament load to tremendous
firepower. The fifty caliber machine gun, can-
non from 20 millimeter to 75, rockets, and
a wide variety of bombs all came into univer-
sal use during this period. Machine guns
that were synchronized to fire through the
propeller arc were dropped because they were
inefficient. Instrument techniques and
instruments were developed for especially in
Europe it was found that to hit the enemy
on their own ground you might have to fly
instruments 90% of the time. Sighting at
the beginning of the war was a problem[,] but
techniques were developed as well as gunsights
until today we have our present day com-
pensating sights.

Pilots of P[-]38s in the Pacific were a-
mong the first to find out that they couldn’t
fight like the enemy. Our P[-]38s weighed from
fourteen thousand pounds to nearly twenty thous-
and pounds and was one of the faster planes
used. It had tremendous firepower with its
four machine guns and cannon all grouped in
the nose. The pilot was comparatively well pro-
tected by armor plating, sealing fuel cells,
and many other features. The P[-]38 worked generally
as a high altitude fighter and had a very long
range. Their enemy usually had plane that
weighed approximately six thousand pounds
fully loaded. Their armament usually consisted
of machine guns of 25 caliber and very small
cannon.[2] The plane was built very light and
the pilot had very little if any protection. Gener-
ally these planes were at low or medium altitude
and were of short range. The P[-]38 pilots found out
the hard way that they couldn’t dogfight and
ever have very much success in destroying the en-
emy. The light[,] slower planes were much more
maneuverable. It was found that the P[-]38 had
advantages of it’s [sic] own. Speed was the most
important and by using this an element
of two would make a high level pass from

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behind[,] fire[,] and then use their superior speed
to gain altitude for another pass. If a P[-]38
was caught by enemy planes at a disadvantage
generally the best way he could get out of it
was to go into a shallow dive to out distance
the bogies on his tail. If the bogie tried to
stay there he stood a good chance of loosing [sic] his
wings when he pulled out of the dive. The
F[-]51s and F[-]47s in the Pacific had similar
problems[,] but were more maneuverable than the
P[-]38.[3] The enemy planes were usually vulnerable
in most any spot on them. Non[-]sealing fuel
cells, oil tanks, engine compartment, and pilot’s
compartment were all comparatively unprotected.
In Europe[,] it was found that the armament on the
enemy aircraft was considerably better than in
the Pacific. They were well protected with armor
plating and their fuel cells were self[-]sealing. The
planes were well built and maneuverability and
performance came very close to being the same as
ours. Teamwork on our part was one of the
best defenses against their fighters. When
one of the enemy planes was shot down or cap-
tured where it was possible for the Air Intelligence
people to look it over we learned much helpful
information. Performance, range, service ceilings,
changes in armament, home base of that particular
type of aircraft, any improvements, weak points
were all passed on to the fighter pilot and with
a better knowledge of the enemy and what he
could and could not do. One plane was found to
[be] extremely vulnerable to a burst between the cockpit
and the engine. Gasoline and oil tanks were located
there. Another would lose a wing with a well plac-
ed burst in the wing root. Still another had a
high pressure oxygen tank located near the the [sic]
tail and a shot through this would sever the
tail when the tank exploded. There were other
weaknesses that showed up from time to time and
were taken advantage of. I know that this
perhaps would sound like it had nothing to
do with fighter tactics to some people[,] but
knowing the enemy plane and what he can

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do dictates changes in fighter tactics. Groundbound
rules can’t be used[,] but changes must be easily
made to cover the situation.

Before the last war we knew very little about
instrument flying and our instruments were
grossly inadequate. It didn’t take us long to
find out that to accomplish our mission we
needed to develop instrument flying. Today[,] if the
ceiling is high enough for the planes to get off from
the home station and high enough to accomplish
the mission at the target[,] it doesn’t make any difference
what kinds of weather is between the two points.
Even now there are all[-]weather fighter groups which[,]
by using radar[,] can accomplish their mission
in spite of weather conditions. These groups
were first night fighter groups during the war
and have advanced until they are now all[-]weather
groups. Stress is being put on instrument flying
and in a few years I believe that all fighter groups
will be all[-]weather. An all[-]weather group will be able
to accomplish it’s [sic] mission much more satisfactory-
ly than the regular fighter[-]interceptor group.
Wonderful progress has been made on radio aids for
using [sic] in both weather and contact flying. Visual
Aural Ranges, Loop and Adcock Ranges, commercial
Radio stations, Directional Finder Stations, and
Radar (ground control approach and warning net) all
Play an important part in helping the fighter
pilot do his job.

The keynote to the present fighter tactics
is cooperation. From the time a mission is started
until it is concluded you are cooperating with some-
one. An example of this is a radar station which
notices an unidentified plane on it’s [sic] scope head-
ing toward the area the fighter group is response-
ble for. The fighter group is notified and they in
turn scramble enough planes to take care of the
unidentified aircraft. As soon as the aircraft are airborne
they make radio contact with the radar net and find which
direction they need to take to intercept the bogie. They
give the altitude that [recte: of] the bogie and the approximate
time the interception will take place. If it is suspect-
ed that the bogie might be unfriendly[,] the radar operator
will direct the intercepting planes slightly to the
side so they’ll have the advantage of having the sun

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to their back. Usually the intercepting planes will
try to get and [sic] altitude advantage. When the interception
is made the intercepting aircraft identify the bogie
and if it is unfriendly approximate action is taken. If
friendly radio contact is made and pertinent infor-
mation is received and relayed back to the radar opera-
tions. Quite often a friendly aircraft either has
inoperative I.F.F. or the wrong code of the day.

Fighters are never on lone wolf missions nowdays.
Elements of two aircraft, two elements for a flight, four
flights for a squadron are the terms used. In the
element the leader is number one and his
wingman flys [sic] in such a positon that he can
protect the element leader from attack. The planes
should be nearly abreast of one another with sufficient
clearance so that either man could turn inside
of the other plane in case of an attack from the
rear. In case of an attack on both planes from the
rear[,] both can turn in a sissors [sic] action to get a
chance at the bogie on the other plane’s tail.[4] The
idea is to lead the bogie if you can’t get rid of him to
where the other aircraft can take care of him. An
element which has this worked out have a
great deal in their favor from the start. The
flight works in the same way as the element.
Each element works to protect each other and
Destroy the enemy. The squadron’s four flights
Work in approximately the same way as the
element in a flight. This seems to be the easiest
way to destroy the enemy with a minimum loss
in your own squadron, flight, et cetra [sic]. In attack-
ing either fighter or bombers it is always best to
use the element of surprise if at all possible. Attack
with the sun to your back and with an altitude ad-
vantage. In an attack of this kind it is best to
take an interval sufficient to keep a concentrated
fire. After firing[,] break below and clear yourself in
the blind spot beneath the wing before gaining
altitude for another firing pass. The wingman
is always hit first and with a concentrated attack
like a flight hitting one plane[,] he’s usually disab-
led and the next wingman is the subject of the sec-
ond pass. On a fighter the best position is at-
tack from the tail vicinity and second best is
a head[-]on pass. On a bomber it comes back to

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the fact you have to know your aircraft. For one
may be heavily armed for a tail attack[,] but ineffective
from any other attack. Another one might be heavily
armed except from below. Another may be unarmed.
There are many approaches which can be used to
attack and the attacking fighter pilot should use
the one which he can do the most damage with
the least likelyhood [sic] of receiving serious damage him-
self. The approaches which can be used are the
90° side approach, overhead, head[-]on, tail chase, and
the variations which can be worked on all except the
overhead[;] such as high, level, and low approaches.
For an aircraft like the B[-]29 with central fire control
the gunnery is very good[,] but by using two or more
aircraft attacking from different sides they either
have to use the turrets individually or be un-
protected from attack on one side or the others.
Operated individually[,] the turrets aren’t nearly as
effective. The bombers or transports are usually
most vulnerable in the engines.

Fighter tactics in peacetime are just generalities
as when in actual combat conditions you don’t
have the same tim(i)d aircraft and pilots to pit
yourself against. The use of movies, models,
drawings, and lectures are all excellent[,] but getting
a chance to practice what you’ve seen or heard is very
important. Fighter sweeps at low level, gunnery
(ground and aerial) camera gunnery, interceptions,
cross[-]country flights, rat races, formation (both
show and combat) and an occasional pitting one
element against another and working out these
types of defense with the aircraft being used. After
a flight analize [sic] your troubles and what causes them
and if you can’t correct your trouble at least make
an improvement.

In conclusion[,] remember that knowing
your aircraft an it’s [sic] shortcomings as well as it’s [sic]
good points; being able to get to where you are
needed whether by instruments, radio, or radar;
knowing your enemy and his aircraft and what
it will and won’t do all add up to Fighter
Tactics. To the mission accomplished
it simply takes knowledge, practice and coop-
eration.

P-47D-23-RA, s/n 42-27884, Maj. William D. Dunham, 460th FS, 348th FG, Tacloban, Philippines, December 1944

P-47D-23-RA, s/n 42-27884, Maj. William D. Dunham, 460th FS, 348th FG, Tacloban, Philippines, December 1944