John Dupre wrote:
From what I have read the various Arab air forces usually claim that the Israelis were never as good as they seem to be and that the spectacular successes were the result of foriegn pilots. If they are not claiming that then the Arabs are claiming that they were outnumbered.
Having worked closely with current incarnations of both the Israeli AF and more than one Arab AF, the correct answer is somewhere in the middle.
While very
good, the Israeli Air Force is nowhere near the
11-foot-tall monster that their PR machine would have you believe them to be. Certainly for a group of their size and resources, they are very skilled and can wield very effective airpower. They have been able to pull off some spectacular victories against what appear to be phenomenal odds.
The other side to this is that Arab air forces are generally NOT very skilled. In making such a claim, I am flirting with painting several countries with a VERY broad brush, but I have seen enough evidence to support such a generalization. I've worked directly with two (not including this new-fangled post-2003 Iraqi Air Force!) and have spoken with acquaintances who have flown with two other Arab air forces.
Arab air forces are less interested in actual combat skills than they are of leaving potential foes with the
impression that they are skilled. They are interested in having good equipment (aircraft, weapons), and flying that equipment, but they have no legitimate interest in having tactical prowess in the employment of those aircraft and weapons. They are very concerned with how things "look", and less concenred with how things "are". More detail on that below...
So, the result of this is that it has been easy for Israel to be the "badass" of the block when all the other kids on the block have been idiots.
That's not to say that the Israelis haven't pulled off some amazing feats -- they have. But the fact of the matter is that their opponents haven't exactly been highly skilled.
The Israeli Air Force has been able to exploit the importance of
perception of skill into the "myth" that they enjoy today -- that the IAF is an absolutely superior fighting force that, pound for pound, is the best in the world. They have parlyed their decisive victories against mediocre enemies into this perception. Add into that the relative secrecy under which the IAF operates, and you have all the makings for a real whopper of a story.
The reality is that the IAF is simply a good Air Force. They have a great fighting spirit, and because they are actively engaged in legitimately defending themselves all the time, they have avoided the PC craziness that has infested the USAF and are able to focus only on being the best fighting force they can be. They fly with a good mix of equipment (some of it FANTASTIC, like the Python V missile, etc) and have a unique way of keeping a large cadre of experienced pilots/aircrew available and ready for all-out war.
As an aside to the conversation, I have a good friend who recently returned from an exchange assignment with one of the Arab air forces I mentioned above. His end-of-tour report to USAF headquarters is absolutely astonishing, and gives a little more detail into why I make the statements above. Here is one paragraph in his overall summary:
Quote:
It is with regret that I say that I feel the XXX Air Force will never be anything better than a mediocre Air Force.
This is not a factor of ability or intelligence, it is a plain and simple difference in culture that contradicts the standards with which USAF pilots have been born and bred. Their causal attitude towards time constraints comes across as unprofessional and indolent when they show up late to briefs and debriefs. Their comfort in sticking with what they have always done comes across as being lazy or apprehensive to try something new in which they may fail before they eventually succeed. Their method of learning through rote memorization rather than practical application prevents them from thinking out of the box; 90% of them can rattle off insignificant system specifications for the [specific type of fighter aircraft weapon system], but they can’t tell you why [using said system] will defeat enemy threats. Their method of passing down information by word of mouth leads to them teaching outdated and incorrect procedures rather than seeking updated information. Their social and rank structure prevents younger motivated aircrew from questioning the (often times incorrect) teachings of senior ranking instructors.
I would argue that every USAF flyer comes to this country with a true motivation and desire to help the XXXXX. But slowly over the course of our tour, that desire is chiseled away. Their inability to provide a consistent schedule – 0430 wakeup one morning and night flying the next – wears on us. The lack of professionalism and respect – instructors who show up late to briefs or debriefs (if at all) and answer cell phones while we brief – wear on us. The repetitive instructional mistakes – realizing that you can only correct the instructors so many times in front of the students before they begin to lose face – wears on us. The administrative buffoonery – showing up at 0530 only to find that your brief time was moved to 1000 or your sortie was cancelled all together and nobody bothered to tell you – wears us on. The maintenance fears – knowing the extent to which XXXXX maintenance pencil whips their forms and wondering whether your jet will return safely – wears on us. The pilots who are scheduled to double-turn with no chance to debrief become aggravated. The desire to teach and help the XXXXX thrive is replaced with a desire for self-preservation and the realization that trying to make them better is losing battle that will only cause you frustration.
While [US military] advisors remain in place to assist XXXXX aircrew, they will never become a proficient or self-sufficient Air Force.