WARBIRD ACCIDENT REVIEW

[EDowning]

Bill Greenwood wrote:

Eric, I think there are two "next" of areas. Both are in the area of human performance or human pyschology. In some cases I think we get resigned to accidents and don't think we can really do anythjng about it. If we are honest we know the danger is there, it isn't as safe as driving or riding in the boredom tube, but can we make it better. There are starting to be some small efforts to address the mental aspect of pilot performance. Not just did the other guy do something dumb, but why did he do it ? Was he fatiqued or hung over, or desperate to get home? One obvious cause of a lot of fatals is low altitude acro. Another insidious one, especially as we get older is getting in a hurry. One reason I really like to get fuel and oil service when I arrive at a show is so I can then relax, both mentally and physically, and get prepared to fly. I could have flown just fine in the wind Sat at Midland, but I felt about 85%, not quite at my best. I find when we have to hurry we tend to miss things or make poor decisions, at least I might. The other part is how much do we really value safety, is it primary to us or just one of the concerns?

Agreed.

[rstenevik]

I am glad to see the dialog, but am disappointed in the small number of people in the conversation. Statistics are a tool safety folks use to identify trends and identify areas where special emphasis can raise awareness about what we are doing wrong lately. I do not know why, but there seems to be cycles in our weak areas. This is one reason why a long-term database is useful. There are no new causes for aircraft accidents. We have a summary of CAF accidents, and I will be glad to share it with anyone who is interested; I suggest we use it as the model for a Warbird accident database. It is a tremendous amount of work to do this, but I am willing to tackle it. I need a list of aircraft by make and model with nomenclature that defines the list of Warbirds. The second thing is money to pay the sole contractor the NTSB uses to retrieve reports from their archives for years before 1962. I am not sure how useful that data will be, other than having a comprehensive database for posterity and reference; however, I think we should do it.
I have thoughts about Doug’s reference to risk of the modern military and Bill’s low level acro, but I type too slow to go there now.

[bipe215]

I may be wrong, but I think Bill's low level acro is rolls only at 500 ft.

Pretty safe stuff if you know your airplane well.

Steve G

[Randy Haskin]

Seriously, guys...

What good is an accident database if the warbird COMMUNITY isn't interested in having a "safety culture" in the first place??

All of this discussion is interesting, but outside of Doug Rozendaal and a couple dedicated CAF flight safety folks, there are really very few warbird owners, pilots, and maintainers who pay any more than lip service to flight safety.

Doug's NWOC presentation is EXCELLENT, and it hits right to many of the important core causes for warbird accidents. But...is anyone LISTENING?

The problem is that the "warbird community" is made up of so many different personalities from so many different backgrounds that it is difficult to establish a single baseline for everyone to start from.

We could seriously reduce accidents and incidents if "we" would just do two things:

- Maintain the aircraft to a high standard
- Stay current in operating them

Problem is, both of those things cost money...lots of it...and only those at the "top" of the warbird financial pyramid are doing this.

ONE SIMPLE THING could also greatly reduce accidents and incidents -- operators putting their egos aside and honestly evaluating and criticizing their flight performances after flying in an effort to improve their performances.

I have found in my limited exposure to it that there is a noticeable lack of basic briefing and debriefing skills (as well as a lack of willingness to participate in "critical" debriefs) in the warbird community...mostly because it's not "fun" for someone to have their flying criticized by someone else. Most warbird operators fly for the fun of it, and to have someone critique their performance many times spoils that fun.

Unfortunately, honest CRITICAL discussion of flights are the ONLY way to ensure safe performance.

We say in the fighter business, "The perfect fighter sortie has never been flown"...meaning that thus far in the history of fighter aviation there has never been a sortie in which every pilot has performed so perfectly that no post-flight debrief is required.

I dare say the same is true for warbird aviation.

The reality is that briefing and debriefing is a skill -- it's something that a lot of time is devoted to in military fighter flying. Upgrading pilots are known to "fail" the flight based on their brief alone and never even make it to the jet to fly that day. So, we know the skill is not EASY, and it needs to be learned. The FAST group is making an honest stab at this type of brief-fly-debrief mentality (there are probably some others, too, but FAST are the only folks I've personally seen trying to teach and execute this), but again it comes down to the willingness of the participants to leave egoes at the door in the name of safety.

Doug, I applaud your efforts -- your voice is the one I hear the strongest speaking what I think is the correct message. I only wish that others would join you -- the future of the warbird community's ability to continue flying IMHO hinges on it.

[Bill Greenwood]

Randy I strongly agree with part of what you wrote. First the part that I am not in agreement with: that accidents are in large part caused by either airplane condition or lack of currency. In most warbird accidents that I know of recently, the planes were in good or better condition. Most warbird owners put a lot of time, effort, and money into their planes, within the reality that we can't get a factory new Merlin, etc. Many of our planes are fairly low hours since new, mine is around 2600. To my knowledge none of the fatals at Reno were due to poorly maintained planes, nor any recent ones at Osh. Even the P-51C accident a few years ago which seems to have been an engine problem, was in a plane that had been restored and with a fresh overhaul. As for currency, some if not most of the losses have been among our more experienced pilots. The part about having genuine debriefing would be good, it rarely happens in a meaningful way. One example we had a group at Osh led by one of our most experienced guys, but when we landed he was off flying with the heritage group, so everyone went their own way. Another time this year I was told by our leader, who incidently only started flying with us a few years ago, "that I had missed the debrief and the pilot behind me complained that I had flown out over the lake". I knew I had not, Spits don't float, so I looked up the complaining pilot, who has test pilot, Reno and CAF experience. Turns out he said nothing about safety, but wanted me to pull up vertically rather than making sharper turns so he could display his plane that way. We do in our forums cover many accidents, but I wish time was set aside to do more of this. Also friends and realatives are so sensitive about any discussion that might be pilot error of their guy, and large amounts of money may be involved. Many times the interest is more in putting on a good show and rushing as many acts together as you can. At a Denver show one of our longest time pilots actually told me I couldn't fly formation unless I was willing to begin my takeoff while the previous plane was still on the runway.

[Bill Greenwood]

Steve, my acro card is rolls only and a 500 foot limit. That is the way I want it. I am not going to do vertical maneuvers near the ground, they are significantly more dangerous. In a loop, you are setting up two situations, nose straight up at slower airspeed and nose straight down at high speed. Both of these conditions, if not corrected within about 10 seconds are likely fatal. When I practice loops I go to 8000 agl, even higher when I did spins. Yes, I am fully aware that many expert pilots do loops at 500 feet. I am also aware of what a beautiful Mustang looks like after that goes wrong too low to recover and the sorrow of the families involved. Probably 70% of warbird fatals, especially in the past, involve some sort of acro, or high g turn or stall too low to recover. It is awful to take a passenger with you when doing this. When I do a roll in a show I begin at the book entry speed given of 206knots (for an average RAF pilot), at 500' and a nose high climbing entry. I could probably do it at 100', but the ground is hard and best 9 out of 10 won't pass. Because I have a lot of Spitfire time and am pretty familiar with feel under high g, I don't mind doing hard turns near the ground, but I am not going to hang nose high and low speed and high power all at the same time.

[Randy Haskin]

Randy I strongly agree with part of what you wrote. First the part that I am not in agreement with: that accidents are in large part caused by either airplane condition or lack of currency. In most warbird accidents that I know of recently, the planes were in good or better condition. Most warbird owners put a lot of time, effort, and money into their planes, within the reality that we can't get a factory new Merlin, etc. Many of our planes are fairly low hours since new, mine is around 2600. To my knowledge none of the fatals at Reno were due to poorly maintained planes, nor any recent ones at Osh. Even the P-51C accident a few years ago which seems to have been an engine problem, was in a plane that had been restored and with a fresh overhaul. As for currency, some if not most of the losses have been among our more experienced pilots.

Excellent points regarding maintenance, and you're correct that this year's accidents had little to do with poorly maintained aircaft.

However, regarding currency versus experence...high performance flying is a PERISHABLE SKILL. If you don't do it often, you lose some of those skills, regardless of your experience level (unless you're a Bob Hoover).

In Afghanistan, my Wing Commander -- a Weapons School graduate with over 3,500 fighter hours -- would only fly during the day and as the wingman of an experienced flight lead. He knew that his recency of experience wasn't enough to make him an effective or SAFE flight lead -- and would gladly say that to anyone.

If you want to fly high performance airplanes and do high performance things (airshows, acro, formation, racing), you've got to get the correct training and PRACTICE. To think that you can sit over the winter, then go jump in the airplane come spring and be as good as you were last summer is foolhardy.

The part about having genuine debriefing would be good, it rarely happens in a meaningful way. One example we had a group at Osh led by one of our most experienced guys, but when we landed he was off flying with the heritage group, so everyone went their own way. Another time this year I was told by our leader, who incidently only started flying with us a few years ago, "that I had missed the debrief and the pilot behind me complained that I had flown out over the lake". I knew I had not, Spits don't float, so I looked up the complaining pilot, who has test pilot, Reno and CAF experience. Turns out he said nothing about safety, but wanted me to pull up vertically rather than making sharper turns so he could display his plane that way. We do in our forums cover many accidents, but I wish time was set aside to do more of this. Also friends and realatives are so sensitive about any discussion that might be pilot error of their guy, and large amounts of money may be involved. Many times the interest is more in putting on a good show and rushing as many acts together as you can. At a Denver show one of our longest time pilots actually told me I couldn't fly formation unless I was willing to begin my takeoff while the previous plane was still on the runway.

Again, great points...that mirror my limited experiences, too. If there was a legitimate safety culture, debriefs wouldn't be optional. Nor would pilots WANT to miss debriefs because they would desire to improve their skills and maintain the highest levels of safety.

The other human factors aspect that this debriefing discussion dances around is "complacency". Too many pilots think they're too good for anything bad to happen to them. Not only do they not WANT to debrief (and have their flying criticized) but they also don't think they NEED to debrief.

[Bill Greenwood]

Randy, I try to get some practice come Spring or if I had not flown for a time, and I assume others do also. Are you very familiar with civilian warbird operations, or just think we don't do it? I certainly practice acro before doing it in a show. One "practice" story: if you race Unlimiteds at Reno an engine out landing is a very real possibility. I was talking to Tiger D. once about a Mayday he had in Strega, and how well he had landed despite a dead engine and oil on the windscreen. Tiger said it was easier than you might think since he had done it a 100 times already, every morning in the shower he rehearsed it in his mind. I try to do similar reviews, and I plan to do some in the plane when I take it in for annual in a couple of weeks. Just like being rusty on instruments, I try to limit my exposure when I am less current, for instance being cautious and gradual in a group formation join up if it is my first of the year.

[Randy Haskin]

Are you very familiar with civilian warbird operations, or just think we don't do it?

Not familiar enough...just hanging around ops numerous years at SnF and Reno, flying (okay...riding) at a couple FAST events, as well as a visit to NWOC last year.

That's just my opinion garnered from this limited exposure...I'd love to be shown that my view on the issue is completely incorrect, because that would mean that there IS a legitimate safety culture in the warbird community.

I've heard Tiger speak before regarding how much he mentally rehearses flying the course at Reno and handling maydays. If only the rest of the warbird community had his level of professionalism, because it's spot on.

[Bill Greenwood]

Randy, it sounds as if you are fairly familiar with what we do. We almost always have a preflight briefing( FAA even insisted on having two at a recent Denver event), it can be a formal one over more than an hour a la Osh, or a 10 min one if we have a small group of experienced pilots perhaps going for a local flight. It is best practice to have a debrief, but not always easy. Let's say we fly the Sunday show at Midland and depart from it without landing, or at OSH the flight lead is up doing a Heritage Flight or Missing Man when the rest of us land. Also after flying we mostly don't have crews to do the fuel and oil service, I may be doing it myself post flight. It is not so much guys skip debrief, it is more that safety is not always the focus above all else. So much of it is on putting on a good show. I have a few times made safety suggestions, most of the time they are brushed off or the other pilot denies it can be a problem. We do however, do some things informally. After the takeoff accident at Osh that left Ladd injured, we did emphasize waiting until the previous plane cleared. A big problem is that some of the pilots are not at Osh or NWOC to hear these discussions. Another place is the type specific forums. They are mostly maintenance, especially ADs or items that are safety related. Vlado hosts the P-51 one, and if there have been a lot of accidents we have addressed them there to some extent. I wish we had a forum to analyze safety and accidents directly. It is so hard not to step on relatives or friends feelings. A few years ago our formation flight from Kenosha to Osh got in some lowering weather. I and two Mustangs turned back, the lead two barely made it in. It wasn't that big a deal, we could laugh about it later, but the flight lead did apologize to me. A few years on he was lost in an accident, and I wrote what I thought was a tribute to him as a friend, and I mentioned this incident, and that he had been decent enough to apologize. I got an angry letter from his family attacking me and swearing that in 30 years that pilot had Never Once flown in low weather. This despite the fact that other flights were caught beneath the same weather and dozens turned back. Go back and look on Wix after this years Osh crash, there were immediate angry requests not to discuss details or causes. So it makes it hard to change the culture when people don't want to have an open mind or they waste time on bs like how you check in on the radio.

[T33driver]

Good points here on warbird safety and I agree Doug's NWOC presentation has got it exactly right. Warbird safety and my area, jet warbird safety has a longggg way to go. Randy raises a great point about the importance of a thorough briefing and defriefing and the positive impact that has on safety, a smooth running sortie and training to improve future ops and avoid repeating errors. The Red Star (Yak/Nanchang) guys have a strong safety culture and emphasize flight safety and procedural discipline to a very high degree with their members and it's put into practice at their formation clinics and fly-ins. They're sort of emulating the military's way it seems to me and this is a good thing. How you check in on the radio seems like a trivial point, but sharp, by-the-book standard phraseology from a wingman is one more indicator to me that he's squared away, paying attention to detail, and ahead of the airplane. I had a wingman at an airshow in Sept that missed radio check-in, was garbaging up the radio and interestingly enough way behind his airplane and the whole operation which was a loose, in-trail air show strafe pattern (not a particularly tough mission profile). For next year, he's not going to be invited back--nice enough guy whom I know, but he was over his head for the second year in a row and I told the lead and one of the show principals, he's got to go...they agreed. The challenge is getting us owners/operators to embrace what Doug's saying, put it into practice and conduct our ops with greater discipline and attention to external factors like weather, maintenance, and sortie difficulty, as well as our proficiency, currency/recency and experience. Not that a lot of operators aren't doing it now, but the poor warbird safety record begs us for better diligence on these issues. Hence Doug's urging for self-reflection and reevaluation of our status quo. As Randy knows, the military has dedicated Wing Safety personnel, an Operations Officer, Squadron Commander, Standardization/Evaluation Officers, Flight Leads, etc. etc. all serving a supervisory role with enforcement authority to subordinate flight crews subject to their regulations and policies. They pound it into you relentlessly til it's a lense through which you see and conduct every aspect of flight ops...til one day it's like a personal creed to you and you weave it like a faithful believer into everything you do around an airplane. In the warbird world, sure we have the FAA, FAST and ACE quals, air bosses, but we're so much more self-regulated in our operations which brings us back to a need for more education and awareness of safety and risk management which Doug Rozendahl has briefed so well to many of us.

[Randy Haskin]

I got an angry letter from his family attacking me and swearing that in 30 years that pilot had Never Once flown in low weather. This despite the fact that other flights were caught beneath the same weather and dozens turned back. Go back and look on Wix after this years Osh crash, there were immediate angry requests not to discuss details or causes.

Agreed...if people could learn to put egoes aside in the name of safer and better flying, that would be a gigantic step forward.

So it makes it hard to change the culture when people don't want to have an open mind or they waste time on bs like how you check in on the radio.

I have to agree with Paul here that radio performance is a fantastic indicator of the pilot's performance. Count me in as a flight lead who will take an inordnate amount of time debriefing comm if the radios were not pure.

Prior to a fighter flight, a wingman who is on frequency, on time, and answers your check-in rapidly with an energetic "twop!", tells the flight lead that he is ready for business. The cornerstone of the thought process is that if your wingman can't handle the basic aspect of "being there" on the radio, chances are that he's not going to be able to handle "being there" in formation either.

Interestingly, comm is generally the first thing to break down among a formation that is not performing at its peak. I've seen that both in practice and on game day over Iraq and Afghanistan. When your wingman misses radio changes, or fails to use the correct terminology (brevity codes when we're fighting), or doesn't answer promptly/correctly to my radio inquiries, it's an indicator that he's task saturated. Task saturation is one of those human factors that often leads to mistakes...which cause accidents/incidents.

Think about it...whenever you're performing a very difficult task, talking is generally the first thing that you stop doing in order to increase your own concentration. When I used to teach formation in the T-38, I could gauge the student's proficiency level while asking them questions while they were "in position". If they were answering me, it usually meant that they were comfortable enough with the flying that their brain had spare power to process me talking to them, think of the answer, and engage their mouth to respond. Conversely, if they were spending every ounce of concentration on the flying, either they would simply not answer or give me some nonsense answer.

So, there is actually a very legitimate "human factors" reason for harping on radio check-ins in the flying biz.

I had a wingman at an airshow in Sept that missed radio check-in, was garbaging up the radio and interestingly enough way behind his airplane and the whole operation which was a loose, in-trail air show strafe pattern (not a particularly tough mission profile).

There's a simple phrase that works well in this situation...."Two, if you miss the next check-in, you can safe it up and go home."

Naturally, many non-military trained pilots would be VERY angry if their flight lead sent them home -- It DOES sound like quite a jackass move on the part of the flight lead, but it's actually 1)promoting safety and 2)promoting learning.

Remember that accidents are a chain-of-events and as the saying goes, if you can break just one link of the chain then you can prevent the accident. The thought process here is that poor radio performance is indicating possible poor flight performance by the pilot. Sending the pilot back to land is a means of identifying that there is, in fact, a chain of events building, and the flight lead is attempting to break that chain BEFORE it results in an accident. Naturally, it is ALWAYS a point of argument as to if something ACTUALLY would have happened...but I've always been of the opinion that is a better argument to have than arguing with the pilot's spouse over where to order flowers for the funeral.

In addition, sending your wingman home poor performance (home meaning back to land) will also serve as an excellent opportunity to educate and improve performance. Such a heavy-handed act is a great attention-getter and it pounds the message home LOUD AND CLEAR. The trick is avoiding the personality conflict this can cause. If people put their egoes aside -- flight lead AND wingman -- then the situation can be used to point out that the wingman's performance was not up to standard...and the wingman can use the situation to better his own performance in the future. Both guys should walk away from that debrief, slap each other on the back, and have a beer together.

the military has dedicated Wing Safety personnel, an Operations Officer, Squadron Commander, Standardization/Evaluation Officers, Flight Leads, etc. etc. all serving a supervisory role with enforcement authority to subordinate flight crews subject to their regulations and policies. They pound it into you relentlessly til it's a lense through which you see and conduct every aspect of flight ops...til one day it's like a personal creed to you and you weave it like a faithful believer into everything you do around an airplane.

Amen.

That's really the core of the issue, I think. Because the warbird community is essentially a group of people getting together to have fun, there is no real structure which can train, promote, and enforce a safety mentality in the way that the military does.

As a military flight lead, I can get away with the above "send two home for poor performance" scenario because my wingman HAS to do it -- as a flight lead, I actually have legal authority and responsibility to conduct the flight. You just can't say the same thing for a couple of guys who are getting together to fly around their highly-prized warbirds and have fun. They will start to resent flight leads that are tough on wingmen (it's not fun to get criticized, right??), and will prefer flight leads who are easy and let the small stuff go in favor of a quicker and nicer debrief. When that starts to happen, you've all ready lost your foothold culturally. Pilots have to WANT to participate in this type of culture because, unlike the military, there is no LEGAL reason why they have to participate in it.

I think FAST has done an excellent job of getting their foot in the door and laying groundwork for this type of thing (sounds like the Yak/CJ guys are, too), but there is still a long way to go. Unfortunately you can't take a pilot who has flown all of his life WITHOUT this kind of safety lense that Paul mentioned and turn him into someone else overnight.

[Bill Greenwood]

And Randy or Paul, I have seen warbird flights, Jennys etc. where there were no radios, been in some where the P-40 lead lost all electrics and radio. No problem with safety. Randy the situation you are operating in is vastly different than a typical warbird flight at an Airshow. In our situation snappy radio check in on the ground is about as important to safety as a having military haircut or shined shoes. Once we are in the air, we really don't talk on the radio much, we listen to the airboss. Some of the best warbird pilots I have flown with like Howard and Kermit talk the least. The snappy check in briefing bs usually comes from some leader that wishes or thinks he is a F15 pilot. I think the emphasis on a briefing would better be spent on real safety items, like respecting the show line, not rolling while the previous plane is on the runway, spacing out enough on final, rather than trying to sound like Tom Cruise in Top Gun. I think the takeoff accident at Osh was likely caused in part by a lot of radio talk, rather than the caution of looking ahead. But then I am old fashioned, I learned my airshow stuff from old guys like Lefty, I have only flown in a jet once, and sure not in combat.

[EDowning]

Randy, Bill, Paul, All...

I think your comments about formation professionalism are right on, but to Bill's point about the difficulty in debriefing after a show, I must say that he is correct, that the "show" environment often doesn't lend easily to a good debrief. But, I would like you to consider another aspect of the Warbird flying profile. Most of the flights and most of the accidents seem to be occuring in single ship, non briefing profile. There are of course, notable exceptions, but a very small percentage of the accidents/incidents are happening in formation flights or airshows. I, like you, never flew a single military flight, that didn't begin and end with a briefing and debriefing, and had the full array of safety personnel and standards hammered into my head.

As I said in an early post in this thread, I have heard Doug's Safety presentation for several years at the various NWOCs, and what I have come away with is this...what we need more of in the warbird community is self briefing and debriefing, the most difficult kind of safety program, constant introspection. We need to teach the power of having a specific mission/objective for each flight and then self briefing and debriefing the various aspects of that paticular flight. I think that this methodical approach to flying is really only taught to purely GA type pilots (non corporate/airline/(ex)military) for the first time at some of our formation clinics. This is why I am such an advocate for formation training.

Something else we could spend time on, in future posts might be the flying of vastly dissimilar aircraft types together. I don't know about the AF or NAVY but the Army goes out of it's way to avoid non mission essential dissimilar types flying together. It's one thing to pair the various Heritage flight pairing of highly trained individuals to fly together. Quite another to send a Beech 18 to fly in the show with my Skyraider because "we are both bombers". I've flown in shows with all sorts of mixes of airplanes and quite often with very little understanding of the characteristics of the various types, among the pilots.

[Randy Haskin]

Don't make the mistake of keying in on the radio being so sigularly important. As I said, it's an indicator (happens to be a very good indicator) of other aspects of flight discipline. Flight discipline comes in many shapes and sizes, and IT is really the cornerstone of executing a safe flight.

If we're flying in airplanes with no radio, then I expect the wingman to show me that he's got his crap together by being in his airplane, ready to go at check in time, looking at me and waiting for my start signal. I expect him to taxi with the correct spacing at the correct time, to line up in correct position for takeoff, to execute a timely join-up after takeoff, to always be in the position I put him in (or correcting to it) during the flight.

None of this is unique to being in a jet. We could both be flying Cubs for all I care -- the basic premise is the same.

As an aside, just because you don't use the radio "much" during flight, or that it's not important to the execution of your flight, is not remotely an excuse for sounding sloppy when you DO use it.

I also agree that it's never, ever a substitute for flying your airplane.