Great post Pat! Let me answer your second question.
Pat wrote:
BTW, for the sake of debate, what would you have done if you were in FDR's shoes when Pearl Harbor was bombed? Try to appease the Japanese like Neville Chamberlain did with the Nazis in the late '30's? This isn't a personal attack, I just want to hear your "alternative viewpoint".
First off, let's consider what it means to be in FDR's shoes at that moment, and bear in mind that history did not start on December 7, 1941. Japan was pursuing an empire in China and FDR had imposed an embargo that was severe and effective. So much so that Japan was left with three choices: (1) keep doing what it was doing and starve, (2) pull back from Asia, or (3) strike at the U.S. to get us to relax the sanctions and go away. FDR and the U.S. were nearly 100% sure that Japan was going to pick Door #3. War with Japan had been planned for years. We were just waiting for the attack. In that context, there was no choice on Dec. 7 whether to go to war. The decision had already been made earlier in the confrontation.
The reasons for the confrontation are themselves interesting. The putative reason was to preserve the friendly, though hardly democratic, Chinese government of Chiang. Historians have, however, raised an alternative explanation. Thomas J. Fleming, in
The New Dealers' War: FDR and the War Within World War II, gathers evidence that I find moderately persuasive that FDR confronted Japan, at least in part, to provoke an attack that would cause an isolationist Congress to declare war on Germany. (Historical note: In those days, Congress was the "decider" of whether we went to war.) According to the argument, FDR calculated (correctly) that Congress would declare war on Germany as an ally of Japan, freeing the U.S. to contribute fully to the war in Europe; but he grossly miscalculated the strength of Japan as an enemy, figuring that they could be brushed away handily so that the U.S. could get on with the main event. Other historians have advanced this thesis as well (see e.g. Thomas Toughill,
A World to Gain: The Battle for Global Domination and Why America Entered WWII), and I almost hate to endorse it because it comes from the right wing; it is anti-FDR, anti-New-Deal, and supported by people like Pat Buchanan, but although it is a minority view among historians, it is taken seriously. To the extent that it is true, obviously going to war with Japan was even more of a foregone conclusion for FDR when Pearl Harbor was attacked.
So, whatever you think of the back-door-to-war thesis, the U.S. had to go to war. Ah, but what kind of war? Here it is important to recall that Japan had only one goal in attacking the U.S., and that was to spank the U.S. Navy so that the U.S. would leave Japan to pursue its territorial goals in Asia. Japan never had either the inclination nor the means to conquer or invade the U.S. itself. Japan realized that its military would be stretched too thin even to control all of China, so it wanted only the resource-rich parts; it certainly had no designs on trying to occupy a vast continent, an ocean away, populated by an unruly inferior race (Japan's racist contempt for us at that time was even worse than ours for them). So Total Victory, in Japan's view, was simply being left alone. The American public's fears that the Japanese would invade California were never anything more than wartime hysteria. And our initial objective was to get Japan out of China and preserve Chiang's government, not to annihilate Japan's society.
But the attack on Pearl Harbor and Japan's other early victories were far more successful and embarrassing to the U.S. than either side had predicted. Having no real beef with us, Japan tried not to anger us too much -- for example, they did not bomb Honolulu or any other civilian target during the Pearl Harbor raid, although they easily could have -- but they were still too successful. When the folks back home saw those photos and newsreels, Japan was in for retribution, American style: You give me a bloody nose, I'll kill your whole family. FDR could not rein in that emotion, and the Pacific War became not a war over who would control China, but a war for survival -- the survival of Japan, not the U.S. I'm sure that after a few months of war, the Japanese would have loved to annihilate us as much as we did them, but they never had the slightest capability or realistic plan to do so. For the entire war, Japanese victory simply meant the U.S. packing up and going home.
Now what if we had, at some point, packed up and gone home? What if, after Pearl Harbor, we decided to lick our wounds, cut China loose, and let Japan have its empire? Or what if we had waged the war up through the Battle of Midway, then called up Japan and said, "Okay, we've whupped you and avenged Pearl Harbor, the score is about even now, let's work out how to carve up Asia equitably?" I don't believe these options were realistic, but if they had been, ironically, things wouldn't have been that much worse in the postwar world than they turned out when we "won". After all, we didn't get what we wanted when we set up the Japan confrontation: a friendly, stable government in China. Chiang's government didn't last. The commies took over. If we had let Japan have China, could a Japanese-controlled China possibly have been more hostile to us than Red China? For that matter, even for the Chinese, would life under the Japanese have been worse than life under Mao? He certainly did a lot of things as bad as the rape of Nanjing. Maybe, if we had left Japan alone, the Reds would have beaten up the Japanese for us; or maybe, if the Japanese had beaten up the Reds, we could have made friends (as we have been known to do with military dictatorships when it suited us) and had a strong military ally against communism that we could try to ease into democracy, instead of an impotent Japan whose economy we had to rebuild from scratch on our own nickel. Bottom line, in hindsight, victory over Japan left us with about as bad of a situation in Asia as walking away would have, only many thousands on both sides didn't get to live to see it. Of course, we could not have predicted the rise of Chinese communism in 1941 and anyway, walking away was never a viable political option.
This all has some relevance to Bill's intended topic for this thread, I think, at least insofar as it reminds us of why the Japanese started the war and what their actual goals were. Some of the arguments for using the A-bomb have been predicated on a fallacy that Japan threatened our way of life at home, which really was not true.
August