Aircraft?
Mon Aug 13, 2007 8:50 pm
Guys...I'm new here, but thought the person who posted the photos would want to knwo what those aircraft really are. Maybe not?
1) A former Navy T2C "Buckeye"...
2) A rather late-model MiG-29 Fulcrum C (called a humpback!)
3) A MiG-15UTI trainer
4) An early Glasair SH-2RG
5) A Beech Starship (a few are still flying, by the way!)
6) A very early P2V-5 Neptune, now used as a slurry bomber.
Hope this helps, and I haven't fallen into some kind of trap!!
Interestingly, I may be the only guy on this website who's flown the MiG-29UTI!
Dan S.
1) A former Navy T2C "Buckeye"...
2) A rather late-model MiG-29 Fulcrum C (called a humpback!)
3) A MiG-15UTI trainer
4) An early Glasair SH-2RG
5) A Beech Starship (a few are still flying, by the way!)
6) A very early P2V-5 Neptune, now used as a slurry bomber.
Hope this helps, and I haven't fallen into some kind of trap!!
Interestingly, I may be the only guy on this website who's flown the MiG-29UTI!
Dan S.
Mon Aug 13, 2007 9:20 pm
nope, no trap and thanks a lot, everyone
Tue Aug 14, 2007 5:07 pm
Wasn't the "poorly designed engine removal rig & procedure" actually the improper use of a forklift?
Cvairwerks wrote:Stoney: The early -10's had a propensity to blow cargo doors open or completely off the aircraft in flight. That coupled with a very poorly designed engine removal rig and procedure that caused significant stress on the rear pin on each wing engine and subsequent pin failure, earned it the nickname of the DeathStar. It bore a striking resemblance to the L-1011, which had the name of the TriStar, so it's got hung with a moniker that played off that name and reflected how many of the crews felt about the early aircraft.
Tue Aug 14, 2007 11:23 pm
Cvairwerks wrote:That coupled with a very poorly designed engine removal rig and procedure that caused significant stress on the rear pin on each wing engine and subsequent pin failure...
American Airlines did not use the DAC recommended procedure to R&R the engine from the pylon. Instead, they removed the pylon and engine assembly from the wing as a unit. Upon reinstallation, American had a habit of bashing the lug on the pylon into the clevis on the wing. This damaged the fastener heads that held the clevis onto the wing.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the asymmetrical stall and the ensuing roll of the aircraft because of the uncommanded retraction of the left wing outboard leading edge slats [see fig. 16.2] and the loss of stall warning and slat disagreement indication systems resulting from maintenance-induced damage leading to the separation of the No. 1 engine and pylon assembly at a critical point during takeoff. The separation resulted from damage by improper maintenance procedures which led to failure of the pylon structure.
Contributing to the cause of the accident were the vulnerability of the design of the pylon attach points to maintenance damage; the vulnerability of the design of the leading edge slat system to the damage which produced asymmetry; deficiencies in Federal Aviation Administration surveillance and reporting systems which failed to detect and prevent the use of improper maintenance procedures; deficiencies in the practices and communications among the operators, the manufacturer, and the FAA which failed to determine and disseminate the particulars regarding previous maintenance damage incidents; and the intolerance of prescribed operational procedures to this unique emergency.
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/OHare/NTSB/COPY/ohare-full.html
Lots of blame to go around on this one (including the FAA), but if you have a pre-disposition to hate Douglas you could certainly find some blame there but only if you ignore the primary factor and jump to the contributing factors.
In the Turkish Airlines incident, the door fell off causing a sudden depressurization of the aircraft. That in itself is a problem, but depressurizations are an occurrence that is planned for with oxygen masks, etc.
The real issue was that inadequate venting between the cargo area under the floor and the cabin caused the floor to deform sufficently during the sudden depressurization event to bind the controls.
Investigation showed that the door had been improperly shut by a handler on the ramp at the airport. He had forced it shut and had bent the internal rods and tubes without properly locking the door. Instead of the locking pins fitting neatly around the latches they just jammed against the lugs, and when the cabin reached a critical pressure where the door could not hold the force any more it simply just tore itself away.
Three service bulletins were released for modifications to be carried out on the aircraft. One such aircraft, TC-JAV, was flying with only two of the requested modifications. TC-JAV, a DC-10-10 owned by the Turkish carrier THY, was scheduled to ferry passengers back from Orly Airport in Paris, France to London's Heathrow Airport on the day of March 3, 1974.
Company records indicating that the suggested modifications had been completed on TC-JAV, prior to its delivery to the airline in December 1972, proved to be erroneous. Although adjustments to the lock limit warning switch were made, the work was not in accordance with aeronautical standards. The installation of the viewing port, one modification that had been carried out, could alone have prevented the tragedy, had somebody used it to make a visual inspection prior to the takeoff. The warning placard was also in place, but of no use for two reasons. First it had been printed in English, which the Algerian born baggage handler could not read, and perhaps more importantly, the design of the mechanism and the shodiness of the modifications made it possible to pull down the locking lever, bending the internal components, without the use of any abnormal force. The faulty design also accounted for the fact that a warning light on the flight engineers panel had failed to illuminate, indicating that the door was not locked.
Following the disaster, the F.A.A. issued an Airworthiness Directive mandating a closed loop system on all DC-10 cargo doors. Similar to that used on the Boeing 747, the mechanism is designed so as to prevent closure of the vent door unless the locking pins are correctly in place. Subsequently, the government agency took action to further enhance safety in the DC-10, 747, and L1011 Tri-Star. Cabin floors were reinforced and venting improved so as to increase survivability of the aircraft in the event of a major decompression or structural failure.
http://www.airdisaster.com/special/special-thy981.shtml
The door was improperly latched so the failure by Douglas was that the latching system was not idiot proof? The airline didn't even bother to comply with the service bulletin which would have made it more so.
Apparently doors opening in flight on airliners is not exactly uncommon. Please note that most of these are not Douglas aircraft:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 1395&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 0072&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 6262&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 7869&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 7375&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 2904&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 2733&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 8509&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 7705&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 4338&key=1
Flying is not completely safe and we have learned a lot since that accident in 1979.
Thu Aug 16, 2007 8:51 am
Cvairwerks wrote:Stoney: The early -10's had a propensity to blow cargo doors open or completely off the aircraft in flight. That coupled with a very poorly designed engine removal rig and procedure that caused significant stress on the rear pin on each wing engine and subsequent pin failure, earned it the nickname of the DeathStar. It bore a striking resemblance to the L-1011, which had the name of the TriStar, so it's got hung with a moniker that played off that name and reflected how many of the crews felt about the early aircraft.
You are far too harsh.
As BDK points out above, these issues hardly mean the DC-10 was a deathtrap.
-AA's engince change procedures caused one crash, and a groundcrewman not latching the door caused another...hardly the plane's fault. Even the UAL Sioux City crash was caused by the engine having a metallergic flaw. True in the floor issue and engine outage the damage was made worse by a fairly small design flaws...which have been corrected.
That's how aviation advances...remember the Comet and about a thousand other examples?
Northwest, the USAF and others have flown theirs for years without any safety isues.
I've never heard of the "Deathstar" name until your post...sounds like somebody trying to be cute.
You're entitled to your opinion, but for the benefit of younger forum members who weren''t around to read the crash reports in Aviation Week (Geeze, I'm getting old!!!) I wanted to help set the record straight before another "hangar tale" gets perpetuated.
Thu Aug 16, 2007 12:45 pm
Please reread what I said about the -10. I refered only to the early aircraft. I have friends that have thousands of hours in the left seat of -10's with multiple airlines and they all had reasonbly nice things to say about the later versions of the aircraft, and some even raved about it, but all had frustrations with the earliest ones in their respective fleets.
With new aircraft, there tends to be a lot of things that get into production that have some poor design features that cause some problems with the early versions, but eventually get improved. Test programs are designed so that most of these problems can be sorted out and corrected prior to the aircraft getting too far into production. Unfortunately, it's impossible to test for every possible event or scenario, or the companies would never get the aircraft or product out to the customer in a reasonable amount of time. Designers are human and not infalable, and if it can be screwed up, it's bound to happen at some point in the life of the product. I see stuff like this happen on occasion since I've been involved in flight testing aircraft for more than 75% of my aerospace career.
As to the door problem, as a passenger I've been moved off of early -10's at least twice due to the inability of the ground crew to get a cargo door latched properly. A couple of other times we were delayed in pushback because the crew kept getting an unlocked warning on the door. After numerous attempts, it would finally properly lock. From talking with crews that I knew, until the doors were modded, there were persistant problems with getting the doors latched properly.
AA's problem wasn't the procedure per se, it was that the mechanics who chose to beat a fracture critical pin into a close tolerence hole, when it should have been able to be inserted with light pressure. If it wouldn't go in, there was obviously an alignment problem. It was also a supervision and inspection problem for allowing it to knowingly happen. When stuff gets to the real world, procedures and fixtures get changed all the time because field operations sometimes find better or easier ways to do things. Engineers don't always design things with maintenance or repair in mind, and the wrench turners sometimes find methods or develope changes to procedures that improve things. Sometimes they manage to find ways to screw things up... AA came up with removing the entire pylon/engine assembly to overcome a proble with the original factory method. Unfortunately, it created a situation that was not forseen and AA management allowed a poor workmanship practice to become a common practice.
As to the DeathStar moniker, I heard that for the first time way back in 1980 from various pilots, mechanics and FA's that I knew. Once the problems had been found and corrected, it didn't deserve the nickname, but in typical fashion, it stuck, although by the time it was nearing the end of production, it was starting to fall out of usage.
Souix City was a fluke due to an engineering design reality. The turbine parts from the uncontained failure chopped up the only area where all three hydraulic system main lines were in close proximity to each other. It was a failure that the design engineers had considered to be so remote, that there was not much concern about it. If we as manufacturers had to build products to cover every possible failure, then there would be nothing ever produced. Sometime stuff happens that no one ever thought of. A good example is the schoold districts around here removing all the mulching materials from the playgrounds due to the fact that we have had an unusual set of circumstances that has resulted in at least 5 playgrounds spontaneously catch fire! Ever consider that due to the weather that your flower beds or playgrounds would catch fire? Even the fire saftey guys with decades of experience are scratching their heads over this in our area...Who would have thought that some wet mulch would be a fire hazard?
It's my job to be harsh on things, If I, as a trained engineer and mechanic can screw it up or break it or damage it when we proof out these things, then there is a problem with the design or procedure and we work to fix the problem, hopefully before the product gets to the user. It's a problem because in any industry, things have to be designed to be as idiot proof as possible, but the customers keep producing better and better idiots
.
I've ruined several thousands of dollars of new parts because I managed to install a supposedly simple tool out of alignment. The tool designer thought it was impossible to do this, but I managed to do it. A simple mod to the tool made it impossible to ever do it again. When you have tens of thousands of tools and procedures to manufacture and maintain a product, it's going to happen and more than once in the life cycle of it.
With new aircraft, there tends to be a lot of things that get into production that have some poor design features that cause some problems with the early versions, but eventually get improved. Test programs are designed so that most of these problems can be sorted out and corrected prior to the aircraft getting too far into production. Unfortunately, it's impossible to test for every possible event or scenario, or the companies would never get the aircraft or product out to the customer in a reasonable amount of time. Designers are human and not infalable, and if it can be screwed up, it's bound to happen at some point in the life of the product. I see stuff like this happen on occasion since I've been involved in flight testing aircraft for more than 75% of my aerospace career.
As to the door problem, as a passenger I've been moved off of early -10's at least twice due to the inability of the ground crew to get a cargo door latched properly. A couple of other times we were delayed in pushback because the crew kept getting an unlocked warning on the door. After numerous attempts, it would finally properly lock. From talking with crews that I knew, until the doors were modded, there were persistant problems with getting the doors latched properly.
AA's problem wasn't the procedure per se, it was that the mechanics who chose to beat a fracture critical pin into a close tolerence hole, when it should have been able to be inserted with light pressure. If it wouldn't go in, there was obviously an alignment problem. It was also a supervision and inspection problem for allowing it to knowingly happen. When stuff gets to the real world, procedures and fixtures get changed all the time because field operations sometimes find better or easier ways to do things. Engineers don't always design things with maintenance or repair in mind, and the wrench turners sometimes find methods or develope changes to procedures that improve things. Sometimes they manage to find ways to screw things up... AA came up with removing the entire pylon/engine assembly to overcome a proble with the original factory method. Unfortunately, it created a situation that was not forseen and AA management allowed a poor workmanship practice to become a common practice.
As to the DeathStar moniker, I heard that for the first time way back in 1980 from various pilots, mechanics and FA's that I knew. Once the problems had been found and corrected, it didn't deserve the nickname, but in typical fashion, it stuck, although by the time it was nearing the end of production, it was starting to fall out of usage.
Souix City was a fluke due to an engineering design reality. The turbine parts from the uncontained failure chopped up the only area where all three hydraulic system main lines were in close proximity to each other. It was a failure that the design engineers had considered to be so remote, that there was not much concern about it. If we as manufacturers had to build products to cover every possible failure, then there would be nothing ever produced. Sometime stuff happens that no one ever thought of. A good example is the schoold districts around here removing all the mulching materials from the playgrounds due to the fact that we have had an unusual set of circumstances that has resulted in at least 5 playgrounds spontaneously catch fire! Ever consider that due to the weather that your flower beds or playgrounds would catch fire? Even the fire saftey guys with decades of experience are scratching their heads over this in our area...Who would have thought that some wet mulch would be a fire hazard?
It's my job to be harsh on things, If I, as a trained engineer and mechanic can screw it up or break it or damage it when we proof out these things, then there is a problem with the design or procedure and we work to fix the problem, hopefully before the product gets to the user. It's a problem because in any industry, things have to be designed to be as idiot proof as possible, but the customers keep producing better and better idiots
.
I've ruined several thousands of dollars of new parts because I managed to install a supposedly simple tool out of alignment. The tool designer thought it was impossible to do this, but I managed to do it. A simple mod to the tool made it impossible to ever do it again. When you have tens of thousands of tools and procedures to manufacture and maintain a product, it's going to happen and more than once in the life cycle of it.