World War 2 British bomber question...

[michaelharadon]

Why just one pilot?

[Forgotten Field]

Less needs for pilots means more people for marching up and down the square....

[Glyn]

Depending on the type some of the larger bombers originally had provision for 2 pilots but the RAF quickly went to using a flight engineer in place of the second pilot. I have always assumed it was because of the shortage of pilots in a service that was expanding so rapidly. At the OTU or HCTU these service types (often with considerable operational hours) were fitted with dual controls.

[jet1]

Less needs for pilots means more people for marching up and down the square....

[JDK]

Why just one pilot?

Or, one might ask of the USAAF, why two pilots?

Twice as much cost (training, billeting) for nothing like twice as much value!

I've never read a definitive answer. However the sea may be a factor.

RFC/RAF bombers of the Great War (end) were dual control types (Handley Page O/400, O/1500 Vickers Vimy etc) but some of that may have been to ensure sufficient muscle to manoeuvre. The second pilot often doubled up as nose gunner bomb aimer etc.

In the inter war era, there was a drift towards single pilot heavies, still offering a second set of controls (Handley Page Heyford) when required. Big maritime aircraft of the era, such as the Supermarine Southampton had a permanent two-pilot set up. As did the Stranraer and later the Short Sunderland.

Meanwhile the RAF's mediums were all single pilot operation (Blenheim, Hampden) while the same size maritime reconnaissance types Avro Anson and (US designed, British spec) Lockheed Hudson had two pilot setup, although the second dickie was expected to fulfil other roles.

The concept of a flight engineer (even many other aircrew trades) as permanent jobs rather than second roles undertaken by groundcrew or pilots was not really known - arguably the RAF had become a "pilot's trade-union" driven air force.

The RAF's heavies weren't as heavy as they later became - the Manchester developed into the Lanc for instance, and I suspect the 'need' for a second pilot to relieve fatigue over a long raid wasn't really understood / expected.

Meanwhile it's often forgotten that at the design stage the B-17 and B-24 were strategic bombers with a maritime role expected - either long over-water or anti-fleet actions being required, so their was an expectation that two pilots were going to be required. Had the RAF specified a long-range maritime bomber, that might've had two pilots too; as the Sunderland etc, did.

In short, the USAAF came 'down' from long range strategic bombing ideas with two pilots, the RAF 'built up' from a pan-European bombing (but no maritime element) with one pilot - and had to add a flight engineer. They ended up flying similar raids on similar targets but starting from very different plans.

Very general with some debatable points, but some stuff to consider perhaps.

[Mossie]

My Dad was a Stirling pilot with 570 sqdn. He said Flight Engineers were allowed to take the controls for straight and level only.....unless there was an emergency of course.

[JDK]

My Dad was a Stirling pilot with 570 sqdn. He said Flight Engineers were allowed to take the controls for straight and level only.....unless there was an emergency of course.

Interesting - I'm not sure there was any 'official' approach, but they certainly weren't 'qualified' or officially trained to fly. However many thoughtful pilots ensured that someone on the crew could hand fly the aircraft to some degree. And this saved a few crews when Skipper copped it.

[Zachary]

Twice as much cost (training, billeting) for nothing like twice as much value!

Not saying you are off about the influence of long overwater missions necessitating a second pilot, but I think there are a number of American crews that came back from a mission with the copilot at the controls and an incapacitated pilot that would argue the value of having a second pilot in the cockpit. Now factor in the costs of training and billeting the 8 other men on an American bomber into the mix and the cost of losing them if the pilot is incapacitated and cannot fly the airplane, and I would say the cost of a second pilot balances out. Just something else to think about...

Zack

[JDK]

That's a good point Zack.

It would be interesting to have stats. The stat we wouldn't get would be that of the number of hits to a cockpit area incapacitating both pilots - I suspect that would be quite high as a factor of hits in the area. (For instance, pilots in placed with controls in different parts of the aircraft would, obviously, but absurdly, increase the one-pilot survival rate.)

That kind of math/s probability was something that both the USAAF and RAF were, frankly demonstrably hopeless at pre-war; they simply didn't work out the factors and care about the conclusions, and that said, everyone misjudged loss rates in daylight bombing - the reality threw anyone's assumptions out of the window.

Operational Research in W.W.II was done for Bomber Command, by people of the calibre of Freeman Dyson, and significant analysis of losses/causes and mitigations was worked out and made available, but mostly pigeon-holed by the RAF's Bomber Command high ups - too scientific. The USAAF's relatively brief exposure over European skies (mid 1942-45, as against late 1939-45 for Bomber Command) had remarkable developments in tactics considering the timecales; but had they started with single-pilot operation, it's unlikely they'd have been able to change to dual if that was 'a very good idea'. To that extent the plan was a pre-war one - see above re- assumptions for both bomber forces.

The cost-benefit of a two-crew two-trip per night (theoretical) Mosquito against the heavies, and the relative loss of speed, performance and options for carting a load of gunners and early electronic warfare specialists etc. is an important case study of the compromise between speed vs defence. Whether you are talking boxers, predators, tanks or bombers the perennial performance triangle is the three facets of defence-agility/speed-firepower; bias toward one is at a cost to one or both others.

My original, slightly facetious comment was really that as ever, a lot of questions start from a presumption that one way (or another) is 'more' sensible ('our way', usually, and historic/emotionally preferred rather than evaluated. Had a Brit asked the question, it would have come the other way, as I posed it. For the record, I don't think either's 'right' or 'wrong'). However testing all versions equally can throw up startling results...