Warbird Information Exchange

I need an expert about this operation which failed miserably to cross the Rhine using the single thrust theory. The 101st Airborne was successful in capturing the bridges at Eindhoven as was the 82nd Airborne at Nijmegan. After the operation failed to capture the bridge at Arnhem, did the allies retreat from Eindhoven and Nijmegan or were we able to hold them until the end of the war? What happened to the British XXX Corps after the battle? Where were they used next? Finally, I have always wanted to know how Gen Montgomery reacted to his plan going so wrong. Thanks

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Ain't no sunshine when she's gone!

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Daviemax
Researcher of Post-War B-17 History
Maintains database of B-17s used from 46- on.

As I recall, one bridge in the U.S area was blown up by the Germans and that slowed the advance, so the American's didn't capture all their bridges intact, just the major ones. I think they held there ground around Eindoven throughout the winter. Someone else can probably get you more info Pat.
Jerry

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"Always remember that, when you enter the ocean or the forest, you are no longer at the top of the food chain."

Daviemax, you are oversimplifying and missing a few bits of history in your response.

Eisenhower states in "Crusade in Europe" that he not only approved of the Market Garden plan, but insisted on it being done. While a gamble, if the assault had worked, the open plains of the lower Rhine were ideal for a mechanized/armored sweep like had been done across France in July/August 1944. My opinion is that the operation wasn't "A Bridge Too Far," but rather, "An Air Assault Too Few." While a massive airlift was undertaken, there still was not enough airlift capability to get everybody where they needed to go for a few days. That and the German armored division that was missed in intelligence near the jump-off point bought enough time for the enemy to stiffen the defenses enough to delay the operation (which depended heavily on the timetables).

Antwerp was captured, but couldn't be used due to German possession of the Scheldt estuary, which was the area surrounding the waterways leading to Antwerp. Montgomery was ordered to capture the area after Market Garden had fizzled out, but diverted resources to try to continue to drive the fight towards Germany from Holland. Eisenhower had to remind him to stop the forward motion in Holland and clean out the Scheldt.

Hodges was a great officer and everybody who fought under him respected him. But from September to December, the US Army pi&&ed away great numbers of troops in the Hurtgen Forest which was Hodges area of responsibility. One of the great reasons we had such a replacement crisis by the Battle of the Bulge was due to this wasteful, human-consuming battle. It was totally a US Army show, and very little criticism was leveled against the perpetrators.

When Montgomery stirred outrage by publicly stating that he "had to clean up the US mess," he was mostly referring to the disarray of First Army and other units that came under his control after the beginning of the Bulge and due to the fracture of the lines in the battle. One of the reasons this stirred so much resentment, and has led to years of putting down "Monty" in US print, is that the US positions had held and were beginning to push out against German positions. But if you have spoken with any US veteran of that battle, the overwhelming statement they make about the first few days is "mess and confusion." Montgomery was just stating fact (although the fact perhaps could have been NOT mentioned in public due to security concerns, and it made a lot of US officers angry).

The Bulge plan was Hitler's, and his Generals disagreed with him on it. One of the reasons they gained enthusiasm for it was that they had held the American assault in the Hurtgen with minimal numbers of men, and suspected (rightly) that assaulting through American lines which were thinly held could give them the momentum to make it to Antwerp and cut the lines of communication (read: fuel and ammo) keeping the US campaign going. It was a desperate gamble, and if they had more motor transport and gasoline in the German combat formations, may have made it. ETO would have been a very differently remembered war if that had happened.

FYI, I don't recommend reading any accounts of WWII operations without a heavy critical eye. Authors like to reach "startling conclusions" to titillate readers and stir controversy in order to sell books. The "conflict" between Montgomery and US forces is one such deal. Yes, it was there. Yes, US and British Generals made mistakes at war, probably no more than any other Generals in history. Yes, the campaign in Europe wasted a lot of Enemy and Allied lives. But when you read the number of Enemy casualties and compare the number to Allied casualties, and remember that we were assaulting defensive positions most of the time, it went remarkably well for us all things considered. And Bernard Montgomery had an important hand in making that happen alongside a large number of American leaders.

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REMEMBER THE SERGEANT PILOTS!

XXX Corps held the corridor they created for weeks after the 'end' of Market Garden op, and expanded it where possible. Units of XXX Corps moved on and held the bridges over the Meuse during the Battle of the Bulge and pushed 2nd Panzer Div out of Celles by the end of Dec '44.

It also played a big role in the Rhineland Battles in 'early 45, including the difficult push through the Reichswald Forest.


I've been to a number of Market Garden Anniversary's at Arnhem and been involved with veterans of both the 1st Airborne Recce Sqn, part of 1st AB Div, and veterans of the 43rd Wesses Div which was part of XXX Corps, and there was really no single factor in why it failed, or no single person to blame, incl Monty.
It certainley is a lot more complex your over simply belief.

Plenty of very good books out there on MG to read for the full story.

My understanding is that the Allied troops withdrew across the Waal (at Nimjegen) and that is where the Allied lines stabilized until the British and Canadians returned to Arnhem in January 1945.