Were German WWII engines "that bad"?

[John Dupre]

The Germans could have made all the technology leaps in the world, but did not have the resources to build anything in sufficient numbers. A thousand P-47s beats 10 Me.262s any day of the week.

True, which brings up a couple of interesting points.
The Germans didn't go on to a full war footing until the middle of '44. German aircraft production actually increased each month until a sudden drop off in 1945. I've read that the idea was to pretend on the German homefront that everything was hunky-dory. If you were outside the cities being bombed, this could be believed since Germany was not only a predominately agricultural country, but that the official culture presented this as the ideal. Had Germany made the leap to all-out production in, say 1942 when they had the petroleum supply from their Romanian allies, things might have been quite different.

The other thing I have always found odd, is that the US decided to adopt the German model of technology. Quality over quantity, with ever smaller numbers of more advanced aircraft, tanks etc., when we had just watched the Germans being defeated by following just that plan. This while we were facing the Soviets, who had clung to the (very successful) idea of simply out-producing your enemy. A Tiger was demonstrably worth a dozen Shermans, but we built 15. M1 Abrams we've built about 9000, T-72 about 25000

You have to wonder what German womanhood might have done if they had been allowed to work in war production as happened with all the Allied nations. For one thing I think that sabatoge could have been kept way down simply by integrating more dedicated German women into the work crews. No French or Danish or Belgian worker is going to care if a comrade is leaving out a critical step every other time but a German Frau would notice and do something about it.

As for quality versus quantity the Germans came close to getting away with it, thier fighters and tankers and troops had lopsided scores and just a few more early on might have made the difference. As seen in Iraq thousands of T-72s don't mean much if an Abrams outranges them by thousands of yards.

[redvanner]

The actual German aircraft production increased through the years peaking in late 44 and even wars end 1945 was more productive then Jan 44 and prior. The material they lacked was pilots and fuel.

That said, they couldn't compete with our sheer number plane for plane.



Agreed, an awesome thread btw.

Right you are. They did have enough (partly not very well made) planes. They had (fewer and fewer relatively moderate) pilots, but they did not have enough fuel for even the constantly diminishing number of pilots. And latest from January / February `45 on there simply were no training units at all, they were closed, begining with A/B Schulen, (first A, then B training shut down), then Jagdfliegerschulen (fighter training units) shut down last. My father finished A/B training, was sent for fighter training at Böblingen (Stuttgart), and desperately wanted to move on to an operational unit to fly jets (Me 262`s). But the training was stopped, he was given a rifle and sent to northern Italy as an infantryman. Most probably that saved his life. If he had finished training, he would have had several hours glider training, 50 hours basic training, 40 hours advanced training, and 20 hours fighter training in operational a/c. Not very healthy if someone is shooting at you.

Michael

[DH82EH]

Thanks for that Michael.

You're probably right, in all likelihood that saved his life, which meant you got to be here . Cheers friend!

Andy Scott

[Tom H]

The Germans didn't go on to a full war footing until the middle of '44. German aircraft production actually increased each month until a sudden drop off in 1945.

Actually

There is a US report (apparently done by a Canadian), I believe done for the office of the GAO, if I recall correctly it is the USGG report on the effectiveness of the allied bombing campaign.

Quite the dry read and often quoted out of context, I'll have to see if I can find my hard copy so I can quote it properly.

But the jist...production of components did actually increase particularly after the factories dispersed into the various small often rural almost cottage industries.

Problem was it did not translate into complete aircraft...shortages caused by the allied bombing campaign left hundreds of complete aircraft with no engines, tires and other key components due to the lack of things like bearings, rubber, gaskets etc.

If the report is read in full it actually points this out rather clearly. Unfortunatley some film makers and some academics have quoted only pieces of the report which has led to attempts at revisionist history and spread misinformation.

I've never found the thing on the net but ordered a copy, read it and then my daughter used it as part of a history project.

I'll dig and see if I can find it and the info on it.

In my highly biased personal opinion
Tom

[daviemax]

The Germans didn't go on to a full war footing until the middle of '44. German aircraft production actually increased each month until a sudden drop off in 1945.

Actually

There is a US report (apparently done by a Canadian), I believe done for the office of the GAO, if I recall correctly it is the USGG report on the effectiveness of the allied bombing campaign.

Quite the dry read and often quoted out of context, I'll have to see if I can find my hard copy so I can quote it properly.

But the jist...production of components did actually increase particularly after the factories dispersed into the various small often rural almost cottage industries.

Problem was it did not translate into complete aircraft...shortages caused by the allied bombing campaign left hundreds of complete aircraft with no engines, tires and other key components due to the lack of things like bearings, rubber, gaskets etc.

If the report is read in full it actually points this out rather clearly. Unfortunatley some film makers and some academics have quoted only pieces of the report which has led to attempts at revisionist history and spread misinformation.

I've never found the thing on the net but ordered a copy, read it and then my daughter used it as part of a history project.

I'll dig and see if I can find it and the info on it.

In my highly biased personal opinion
Tom

Thanks, agree. The question of the effectiveness of the Strategic Bombing Campaign needs to start with the word "Strategic." Individual bombing results varied widely and frequently were not very successful - either in accuracy or destructive power. However, as Albert Speer said in his memoirs (paraphrasing) "the B-17 is the one Allied weapon that frightened me; if not confronted (and hopefully stopped) it could range at will destroying specific targets and be reused any number of times, compared to rocket technology, which was both in accurate and a one-time shot." Also, and more importantly, the resources needed to defend against Strategic bombers were of necessity stripped from other priorities, such as the Russian front (800 fighters pulled to combat the 8th AF in 1944). It is important to measure the Strategic Bombing Campaign against Strategic objectives. As an example, dispersal of the armaments industry to avoid damage was as damaging as the bombing itself.