Collings Foundation B-17G 909 Has Crashed :-( 10/2/2019

[mike furline]

was anyone else surprised by the fact that the FAA was providing no oversight for as long as two years for Collings program under the LHFE flights?

Apparently there was a POC (point of contact) appointed but that person died and nobody from the FAA office followed up beyond providing a group E-mail where everything sent to them went unanswered.

Contributing cause? almost certainly not, but troubling nonetheless

I've heard, but cannot confirm that the FAA Point of Contact that died may have been the passenger on this Curtiss Jenny.
http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2016/11/c ... urred.html
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=ERA17FA050

[JimH]

Larry Enlowe was our Point of contact at the Orlando FSDO. Great guy and very hands on. I was in communication with him 3-4 times a month when he came on board. He did lose his life in the Jenny.

Jim

[Baldeagle]

And the $#@& is starting to hit the fan re "aviation adventure" rides:
http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=m ... aca8af3335

This is from one of my fellow biplane rides business people who watched the webcast of the meeting:

"Several ride operators have been getting surprise audits on their drug program and one guy I know of has been fined $7k over a maintenance issue. Looks like the road ahead could be a bumpy one. I’m thinking of turning in my LOA this year.

I was going to text you both a summary of this NTSB hearing that was just broadcast online regarding part 91 operators flying for compensation for hire... but there's just so much info, it was too much to text... so basically here's the summary i've come up with:

The NTSB has found a rise in fatal accidents for operators that seem to "exploit loopholes" in operational requirements... Specifically, the B-17 crash in Connecticut, the Helicopter crash into the Hudson River in NYC, some commercial hot air balloon crash in Texas, a King Air crash carrying skydivers in Hawaii and an "air combat" aerobatic experience crash operating as "flight instruction" ...

Essentially, the NTSB is recommending the FAA move toward a similar regulatory oversight as FAR Part 135 operators by creating a subsection of regulations similar to what New Zealand has recently implemented called "Adventure Aviation"...

This new FAR Part would require increased maintenance oversight, more stringent inspection protocols, establish FAA Operator Certificate requirements similar to Part 135 Charter operators, and establish requirements for operators to implement SMS (Safety Management System) and crew duty and rest limitations, both of which are standard for 135 and 121 ops...

Ironically enough, the host of the meeting opened by saying "Let me be clear, we do not want to shut these operations down or otherwise run them out of business..." which I found funny. When that B-17 went down, I knew this was coming...

Buckle up boys.... the industry is about to change..."


One thing I will add... if you don't have anything nice to say about someone, you're probably talking about an FAA drug enforcement person-


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[ErrolC]

Here are the NZ Part 115 Regs
Devil is in the detail I am sure
https://www.aviation.govt.nz/rules/rule-part/show/115

https://www.aviation.govt.nz/licensing- ... nisations/

An example operator
http://www.warbird.co.nz/about-us.html

Any indication that this will allow the types available for joyrides to be expanded? Currently some of the exceptions require the type to have been in US service don't they?

[ZRX61]

This new FAR Part would require increased maintenance oversight, more stringent inspection protocols, establish FAA Operator Certificate requirements similar to Part 135 Charter operators, and establish requirements for operators to implement SMS (Safety Management System) and crew duty and rest limitations, both of which are standard for 135 and 121 ops...

Are you saying none of that is required & long overdue?.. because even Stevie Wonder can see that it is. I can think of a few people who would still be alive...

[shrike]

This new FAR Part would require increased maintenance oversight, more stringent inspection protocols, establish FAA Operator Certificate requirements similar to Part 135 Charter operators, and establish requirements for operators to implement SMS (Safety Management System) and crew duty and rest limitations, both of which are standard for 135 and 121 ops...
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The Collings program - as written - should already have been closer to part 135 already. The lack of effective FAA oversight, the POC being AWOL for over two years, was as much a matter of negligence as the maintenance and operations that led to the crash.
While the cat's away, the mice will play. While the cat can on occasion be an officious A-hole, he does keep the mice cognizant of their responsibilities. (Before anyone asks, I'm at a 145 operation and know our cat by name)

[Jack Cook]

the POC being AWOL for over two years

he wasn't AWOL he was DEAD!
What stopped Collings from contacting the FAA and saying ''hey where's our POC?"..
Maybe CF though not to ask that question cause life's easier that way.................?

[shrike]

the POC being AWOL for over two years

he wasn't AWOL he was DEAD!
What stopped Collings from contacting the FAA and saying ''hey where's our POC?"..
Maybe CF though not to ask that question cause life's easier that way.................?

Which, for a Federal regulatory agency, isn't an excuse, really.
According to the full report, unsuccessful attempts were made to contact the appropriate FSDO which ended up at dead addresses. No new person was assigned.
Collings' mistakes were egregious, but the FAA gets some of the blame too.

[Matt Gunsch]

It is not the first time the FAA has not replaced someone that had a job in safety. As a A&P, if we find something unusual, or repetitive, we have the option of filing a Service Difficulty Report with the FAA, which goes into a data base that can be searched. The FAA used to publish a summery of the reports monthly with some highlighted. That ended when the person doing it retired, and no one replaced them.

[Baldeagle]

This new FAR Part would require increased maintenance oversight, more stringent inspection protocols, establish FAA Operator Certificate requirements similar to Part 135 Charter operators, and establish requirements for operators to implement SMS (Safety Management System) and crew duty and rest limitations, both of which are standard for 135 and 121 ops...

Are you saying none of that is required & long overdue?.. because even Stevie Wonder can see that it is. I can think of a few people who would still be alive...

I guess you missed the part where I said it was a quote from SOMEONE ELSE.
Also, I'm sure it would've helped with the B-17, but there are a lot of smaller operators where that kind of thing wouldn't help.


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[Forgotten Field]

Re: Part 135, or how do we fly single owner revenue operations.
I am mostly an outsider, looking in. But I have opinions based on my experience with some rides programs maintenance and how I see that aviation works. I am always willing to be argued with, told I am way off base, or disproven. But here goes:

So having watched this for many years, and seeing how things are moving forward, why the gripes? If the LHFE's look like Part 135, act like Part 135, quack like Part 135, then... Why not be Part 135? It's a regulatory framework that has worked for a long time. The whole wink, wink, nudge, nudge, LHFE world has steadily been edging towards that direction for a long time. There isn't an operator out there who works with a warbird who thinks for a second about adopting a maintenance program based on documents written over a half century ago. So why not be advocates for something that really, really, really looks like Part 135 to make everybody comfortable- regulatory side, operator side, public side? Without looking at the dates for adoption, change, and revision, I'd say that 135 was written the same time as the maintenance specs for most warbirds. Why can't we use that as a framework, and adapt it to the operations?

And I'll second the notion that the FAA bears responsibility. Safety belongs to everybody, but the FAA are the arbiters and to have let a position lapse with such a broad, publicly visible, and put-together program like LHFE "because somebody died" is just a garbage excuse. I worked for the government for long enough to know that there aren't a lot of people willing to stand up and stick their necks out for anything, but if operators don't demand FAIR oversight, they aren't going to get FAIR oversight.

For those who would say, "don't poke the monkeys in the cage with the stick," I say there is no reason to fear calling the US Government to account. If you are afraid that they will say, "We can't do it because..." and put and end to LHFE, I say that's crap logic. You know this little thing with the 737 Max? Well, it was their fault too, because of a lack of oversight. What I am saying is, make the US G do its job. If it can't then it's time for letters to congressmen, starting with "In a multi-million dollar revenue operation, we are unable to receive the support we require...."

[Matt Gunsch]

They can't be 135 because the aircraft are not Standard Category aircraft, they are Limited, or Restricted, which the FAA will not allow them to be operated on a 135 certificate.

[OD/NG]

Just an fyi, but the NTSB has publically announced that the final accident report on the B-17 will be released within 30 days. They have determined the probable cause. According to them:


"The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s failure to properly manage the airplane’s configuration and airspeed after he shut down the No. 4 engine following its partial loss of power during the initial climb. Contributing to the accident was the pilot/maintenance director’s inadequate maintenance while the airplane was on tour, which resulted in the partial loss of engine power to the Nos. 3 and 4 engines; the Collings Foundation’s ineffective safety management system (SMS), which failed to identify and mitigate safety risks; and the FAA’s inadequate oversight of the Collings Foundation’s SMS."

[whistlingdeath77]

Just a couple simple questions we can touch on. WHEN or IF do you guys feel the collings foundation will be able to start touring again? 2022? 2025? Never?

My second question would be, although the collings foundation was responsible etc, what could stop them from leasing their aircraft out to different organizations. OR, is there a way they start a brand new foundation with new department heads,( but collings is in the back.)?

Basically saying collings may lose their ride ticket, but if a brand new foundation popped up to run them and abide by the FAA whats to stop that?

[K5DH]

Adding to WhistlingDeath's questions above. . .

Assuming CF is eventually allowed to operate a LHFE program, will they be able to obtain insurance at a cost that will allow them to continue to offer flight experiences at a cost that's affordable to enough of the public to make the program worthwhile? And with the Nine-O-Nine tragedy in mind, will the public trust CF enough to purchase flight experiences from them?