Kyleb wrote:
I am familiar with the Eben Emael attack, which was a precison operation, as you noted. Normandy, which was the context of my question, not so much.
Glad to hear you're familiar with that crucial (in airborne history) raid. Eben Emael was a 'Coup de Main' a particular type of precision operation; and as I said, essentially the same type of operation was, in fact, carried out during the night of D Day, by Major Howard's troops at Pegasus bridge. The principle, operation and utility and type of objective (seize hold and prevent enemy action) was the same.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_BridgeSimplifying, the British were shocked and amazed by the Eban Emael operation, and decided they were going to have that capability. The developed it, and four years and one month later, they did do it themselves. That's a crucial point.
However
around that was the result of the massive expansion of airborne forces (the make it bigger / do more) - nothing illustrates this better than the attempt to offer an air-landing brigade with its own
tanks.
Quote:
I suspect it had as much to do with a decision in 1942 (or whatever) to build a bunch of gliders. By June, 1944, we had gliders so we used 'em, even though they may not have been the ideal way to go to war in that campaign. Also, you didn't have to conduct parachute training for glider troops, so that reduced the number of broken ankles, the training necessary, and the demand for silk...
Not sure that's a viable hypothesis; I don't have data, but I've never read anything that suggest that the allied glider forces
weren't an effective means of warfare; nor that paradrop or other alternatives would have or could have substituted. In Normandy, Market-Garden and the Rhine Crossing glider forces played decisive roles.
Another hypothetical example is that I suspect (data welcome) that landing gliders on Corregidor might've actually been more effective than paratroops; gliders could land in remarkably small spaces, and arrived 'aimed' much more than paratroops - I suspect (but have no evidence) that had gliders been available they'd have been used.
In Eban Emael and Pegasus Bridge an often overlooked advantage was that gliders arrived silently, effectively undetected, having been released from tow some miles away (At EE, roughly 20 miles, at 7,000 ft). Paradrop aircraft broadcast their presence by engine noise, and have to effectively be over the DZ. The expectation was that this kind of 'stealthy' surprise attack would be more used than it was in practice, where airborne 'carpets' became more the allied objective when the capability had grown to that level.
As to the saving in silk, an economic historian might like to run some numbers, but I don't think glider manufacture was a cheap alternative to parachutes. Data welcome! As to arrival injuries, there were a lot on gliders as well; grizzly ones such as when a jeep broke lose and crushed the passengers.
Regards,
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