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I was responsible for the security of a large SAC airbase and aircraft during the cold war. Back then, many of the increased security measures triggered by external events were knee-jerk reactions and mostly window dressing. CONUS bases would increase security if someone shot at a serviceman in Italy. It was just some wing kings covering their azz, and they knew full well their actions were irrelevant. I doubt if anything has changed much over the years.
Today, same as then, many military bases (and large airports) have nothing more than a few strands of barbed wire as perimeter security in places, originally designed to keep livestock from wandering onto runways. Any terrorist with more than two brain cells knows there are easier entrances than the front gates, but that is where many increases are targeted.
One of my duties in the USAF was to play the bad guy, and conduct terrorist training exercises against defending security forces. I became quite unpopular when I wrote a report identifying security vulnerabilities and suggested improvements. Foolish me. I thought they were serious about security. One flaw I mentioned was having six nuclear-loaded bombers parked a few hundred feet from a civilian highway, with densely wooded, uninhabited land on the opposite side of the road. The only thing between a sniper's bullet triggering a “radiological event”, was a thin snow shelter made of .030 tin. I was bluntly told to shut up. Seems the Wing CC and Base CC didn't want to spend a fraction of their discretionary millions to improve security, when that money could be spent on two golf courses, the base marina, the O-club, the flying club, daily catered meals, new furniture for the AAPA Alert Facility, repainting the entire base twice in three years, etc.
The spouses and children of military members were considered cannon fodder and were utilized to stop a terrorist car bomb from entering the base. Whenever the base received a detailed threat, the gate guards would stop all incoming and outgoing vehicular traffic, checking IDs and releasing one car at a time, to deliberately create a 2-way traffic jam. We assumed the terrorist would either leave, or detonate his car bomb against the civilians waiting at the gate. Too bad for them. During the late 1980s- early 1990s, this policy was put into action dozens of times at my base. Today, some bases have physical gates to stop traffic, instead of just a cop with a whistle. However, cars full of women and children will still be waiting at those closed gates when Achmed arrives. They are an easy target, and terrorists have already shot up traffic at the CIA headquarters.
The USAF Security Forces also practiced the organized combat of, and shooting of protesters, under a program called “Confrontation Management”. Ballistic vests, helmets, batons and M-16s. If we found ourselves confronted by a larger group with hostile intent, we were authorized to shoot our way to safety. Our “Emergency Service Teams” rivaled then-current SWAT teams, but had far fewer rules to follow. We killed bad guys in urban environments, and didn't have to consider innocent bystanders who unfortunately got in the way. The Wing Public Relations office had pre-written plans and statements for every situation, to placate the sheeple.
There were some interesting conversations amongst the wing kings and Sqdn CCs in Wing Battle Staff after completion of ORIs. Having launched the first wave of bombers and sent waves 2 & 3 to remote sites, official USAF policy was that everyone shelter on base (in mostly above-ground wood frame buildings) and continue in their present jobs, despite the base no longer having a mission, or aircraft. Unofficially, the senior people had plans to leave the state at 90mph when the last bomber lifted off on a real-world strike. Peons like junior officers and enlisted, and their families, were just gonna have to eat those incoming Russian ICBMs all by themselves. One of my checklists even had a space for me to record the details of each exploding ICBM.
On the civilian airport side, I've worked on the SIDA and the actual increased security since 9-11 is pretty sad. Some days getting a loaded work van past TSA onto the ramp was a major hassle, other days I got waved right through. I was tempted several times to photograph the airport cops, sound asleep in their cars at 3am. It is very easy for baggage handlers to smuggle out stolen luggage items, and just as easy to smuggle in explosives. The aircraft refuelers have an average employment stay of around three months and they have direct access to the fuel systems on aircraft. Some of the people hired to clean airliners couldn't get jobs in fast food places, and they are allowed poorly supervised, midnight access to dozens of hiding spots on airliners. Some don't understand any English and need a translator buddy. Each time I went through annual airport security screening class, when the instructor announced everyone would undergo criminal background checks, 5-10 new hires would quit on the spot. I used to enjoy photographing aircraft, but haven't done so in 10+ years, since someone reported me, and the Keystone cops responded with drawn sidearms. At the time, I was on an FBO ramp, half a mile from the SIDA, wearing a work uniform and ramp badge. I could have gotten better photos from one of the designated “Aircraft Viewing Areas” the city built, for civilians to observe the activities of a large airport. No terrorist would ever think to use those for criminal surveillance. And NO, the airport operations officers do not want to hear about their lousy security.
We're all just cannon fodder. But, a govt PR flunky will happily issue a statement expressing their deepest sympathy over the tragic deaths of our family, and their strong desire to bring those responsible to justice. And then they'll go back to texting their friends about the latest Kardashian trainwreck.
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